Killing Civilians as an Inferior Input in a Rational Choice Model of Genocide and Mass Killing
- 20 January 2014
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy
- Vol. 20 (2) , 327-346
Abstract
This article presents a rational choice model of a regime’s incentive to allocate resources to fighting rebels and killing civilians when facing an internal threat to its political or territorial control. Assuming that intentional violence against civilians is an inferior input and fighting rebels is subject to increasing marginal returns, three weak state conditions – anocracy, new state status, and low income – increase civilian atrocities within the model. Also, two other risk factors for mass atrocities – discrimination and Cold War conditions – can be seen as “price reducers” for killing civilians, thus increasing the quantity demanded for civilian atrocities in the model. The modeling exercises show how intentional violence against civilians can be viewed through an economic lens of optimal choice and how rational choice theory provides a parsimonious way to theorize and generate empirically testable hypotheses about risk factors for genocide and mass killing.Keywords
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