An Evolutionary Game Model of a Regional Logistics Service Supply Chain Complex Network in a Blockchain Environment
Open Access
Abstract
Blockchain technology offers a novel solution to address the issue of information silos present in the complex network system of regional logistics service supply chains. Furthermore, enhancing the willingness of participants to engage in this system has emerged as a critical issue requiring urgent resolution. This study assumes bounded rationality and constructs an evolutionary game model to analyze the adoption behaviors of logistics service providers (LSPs) and logistics service integrators (LSIs) in a blockchain environment. The stability theorem of differential equations is employed to elucidate the inherent decision-making mechanisms present in the game. Acknowledging that traditional evolutionary mechanisms often neglect individual heterogeneity and the dynamic changes in the topological structures of complex networks, this study further involves the development of an evolutionary game model tailored for the complex network of a regional logistics service supply chain. After validating the effectiveness of the model, this research investigates how market environmental factors influence the adoption behaviors of LSPs and LSIs. Finally, through case simulations, the effects of key influencing factors on participatory behaviors within the regional logistics service supply chain are analyzed. The findings indicate that, in a blockchain environment, both prior to and following the adoption of complex network technology in the regional logistics service supply chain, the equilibrium stability of the network system is jointly determined by the total revenues of LSPs and LSIs. External factors in the blockchain environment significantly influence technology adoption strategies. Notably, when both the sensitivity coefficients of market demand relative to price and logistics service costs concerning quality enhancement are high, the willingness of supply chain participants to adopt the technology declines rapidly. As the quality elasticity increases, the technology adoption rates of providers and integrators initially stabilize and subsequently increase exponentially. Changes in the revenues of logistics service providers have no significant impact on technology adoption rates within the regional logistics service supply chain.Keywords
Funding Information
- Social Science Foundation of Shandong Province (24CJJJ25, cgpy23022, 6022311006S)
- 2023 Annual Project of Shenzhen “14th Five-Year” Education Science Plan (24CJJJ25, cgpy23022, 6022311006S)
- Business Administration Discipline Construction Program of Shenzhen Polytechnic University (24CJJJ25, cgpy23022, 6022311006S)
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