Degrees of freedom
- 5 May 2009
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Explorations
- Vol. 12 (2) , 119-125
Abstract
I propose a theory of freedom of choice on which it is a variable quality of individual conscious choices that has several dimensions that admit of degrees, even though – as many theorists have traditionally supposed – it also has as a necessary condition the possession of a capacity that is all or nothing. I argue that the proposed account better fits the phenomenology of ostensibly free actions, as well as empirical findings in the human sciences.Keywords
This publication has 4 references indexed in Scilit:
- Agent-Causal Power2009
- Freedom with a Human FaceMidwest Studies in Philosophy, 2005
- Libertarian Accounts of Free Will2003
- The First Recension of Robert Grosseteste's De libero arbitrioMediaeval Studies, 1991