Data, Competition, and Digital Platforms
Authors:
Top Cited Papers
- 1 August 2024
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 114 (8) , 2553-2595
Abstract
A monopolist platform uses data to match heterogeneous consumers with multiproduct sellers. The consumers can purchase the products on the platform or search off the platform. The platform sells targeted ads to sellers that recommend their products to consumers and reveals information to consumers about their match values. The revenue-optimal mechanism is a managed advertising campaign that matches products and preferences efficiently. In equilibrium, sellers offer higher qualities at lower unit prices on than off platform. The platform exploits its information advantage to increase its bargaining power vis-à-vis the sellers. Finally, privacy-respecting data-governance rules can lead to welfare gains for consumers. (JEL D11, D42, D44, D82, D83, M37)Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 56 references indexed in Scilit:
- The economics of data externalitiesJournal of Economic Theory, 2021
- Autobidding with Constraints2019
- Privacy and personal data collection with information externalitiesJournal of Public Economics, 2019
- Government interventions in a dynamic market with adverse selectionJournal of Economic Theory, 2015
- How (not) to pay for advice: A framework for consumer financial protectionJournal of Financial Economics, 2012
- Brand-specific tastes for qualityInternational Journal of Industrial Organization, 2011
- Optimal Information DisclosureJournal of Political Economy, 2010
- Participation Constraints in Adverse Selection ModelsJournal of Economic Theory, 2000
- Monopoly and product qualityJournal of Economic Theory, 1978
- A model of price adjustmentJournal of Economic Theory, 1971