Focal points in tacit bargaining problems: Experimental evidence
Authors:
- Andrea IsoniAIAndrea Isoni
- Anders PoulsenAPAnders Poulsen
- Robert SugdenRSRobert Sugden
- Kei TsutsuiKTKei Tsutsui
Open Access
- 1 April 2013
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 59, 167-188
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Economic and Social Research Council of the UK (RES-000–22-3322)
- Leverhulme Trust (F/00 204/AV)
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