Abstract
This article introduces a novel leader–follower coordinated cyberattack method with a covert communication protocol in smart substations, which exploits vulnerabilities of IEC 61850 process layer to embed cyberattack orders into sampled value (SV) and generic object oriented substation event (GOOSE) messages. The protocol includes mechanisms for dynamic follower identification, attack-order delivery, and malicious action triggering, supporting multistage cyberattacks. The existing studies on coordinated cyberattacks in industrial control networks lack concrete protocol specifications for cyberattack coordination, which results in implementation uncertainties in real-world systems. To address this issue, this research innovatively develops a covert communication protocol embedded within the IEC 61850 protocol, and a covert communication-triggered coordinated cyberattack mechanism with stealth properties and adaptive information. This work also provides suggestions for defense strategies, including communication standardization and noise injection. The proposed method uncovers the real threat of covert communication in industrial protocols and offers insights on coordinated attack implementation. Validations are provided by test cases on the T1-1 substation and IEEE 9-bus system, where the proposed method can achieve better performance and lower cost of cyberattacks compared to benchmark methods.
Funding Information
  • National Natural Science Foundation of China (U1866209)
  • Zhejiang Power Grid Co Ltd. (5211SX1900PQ)
  • Zhejiang University Education Foundation Qizhen Scholar Foundation

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