Consensus as a Nash Equilibrium of a Dynamic Game
Authors:
- Muhammad Umar B. NiaziMNMuhammad Umar B. Niazi
- Arif Bulent OzgulerAOArif Bulent Ozguler
- Aykut YildizAYAykut Yildiz
- 1 January 2016
- conference paper
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 365-372
Abstract
Consensus formation in a social network is modeled by a dynamic game of a prescribed duration played by members of the network. Each member independently minimizes a cost function that represents his/her motive. An integral cost function penalizes a member's differences of opinion from the others as well as from his/her own initial opinion, weighted by influence and stubbornness parameters. Each member uses its rate of change of opinion as a control input. This defines a dynamic non-cooperative game that turns out to have a unique Nash equilibrium. Analytic explicit expressions are derived for the opinion trajectory of each member for two representative cases obtained by suitable assumptions on the graph topology of the network. These trajectories are then examined under different assumptions on the relative sizes of the influence and stubbornness parameters that appear in the cost functions.Keywords
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