Psychological pressure and the right to determine the moves in dynamic tournaments – evidence from a natural field experiment
Authors:
- Mark KassisMKMark Kassis
- Sascha L. SchmidtSSSascha L. Schmidt
- Dominik SchreyerDSDominik Schreyer
- Matthias SutterMSMatthias Sutter
- 1 March 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 126, 278-287
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
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