New evidence and new methods for analyzing the Iranian revolution as an intelligence failure
- 29 July 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Intelligence and National Security
- Vol. 36 (6) , 781-806
Abstract
The U.S. government failure to predict the Shah’s 1979 fall is a prototypical example of intelligence failure. We complement the close reading of memoirs and State Department documents with computational analysis of the documents in the aggregate, including cables to and from embassies and consulates in Iran. Using several techniques including traffic and sentiment analysis, we find that officials in Iran reported on the protests but did not stress the situation’s severity until too late. D.C. officials were distracted by other events. Text analysis can complement qualitative approaches to more clearly indicate what good intelligence reporting can and cannot achieve.Keywords
Funding Information
- National Science Foundation (1637159)
This publication has 25 references indexed in Scilit:
- The Art of the Intelligence AutopsyIntelligence and National Security, 2013
- Intelligence Failures: What Are They Really and What Do We Do about Them?Intelligence and National Security, 2012
- Towards a New Theory of Intelligence Failure? The Impact of Cognitive Closure and Discourse FailureIntelligence and National Security, 2010
- Intelligence Failure RetrainedPolitical Science Quarterly, 2008
- Intelligence Failures: An Organizational Economics PerspectiveJournal of Economic Perspectives, 2005
- Learning from Intelligence FailuresInternational Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 2005
- September 11 and the Adaptation Failure of U.S. Intelligence AgenciesInternational Security, 2005
- Critical values for multiple structural change testsThe Econometrics Journal, 2003
- National intelligence and the Iranian revolutionIntelligence and National Security, 1997
- Courting the prospective studentNew Directions for Higher Education, 1978