Terrorist attacks, CEO overconfidence, and CEO compensation
Authors:
- Yunji HwangYHYunji Hwang
- Seung Hun HanSHSeung Hun Han
- 1 May 2022
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Finance Research Letters
- Vol. 46
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF-2020S1A5A2A01044408)
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