How Do Consumers Motivate Experts? Reputational Incentives in an Auto Repair Market
Author:
- Thomas N. HubbardTHThomas N. Hubbard
- 1 October 2002
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in The Journal of Law and Economics
- Vol. 45 (2) , 437-468
Abstract
Cement toemphasize physicians incentive to overprescribe care; see Gruber and Owings (1996) and its references.11. IntroductionTransactions involving services are not simple exchanges. Production takes place afterbuyers and sellers agree to the terms of trade. Moral hazard problems arise when buyers can neitherperfectly observe nor costlessly verify quality. Sellers can take actions that affect the size andallocation of the gains from trade. In expert service markets such as health...Keywords
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