Corporate governance, ownership and firm value: Drivers of ownership as a good corporate governance mechanism
Authors:
- M. Belén LozanoMLM. Belén Lozano
- Beatriz MartínezBMBeatriz Martínez
- Julio PindadoJPJulio Pindado
- 1 December 2016
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in International Business Review
- Vol. 25 (6) , 1333-1343
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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