Risk Selection under Public Health Insurance with Opt‐Out
Open Access
- 30 May 2016
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Health Economics
- Vol. 25 (9) , 1163-1181
Abstract
Summary: This paper studies risk selection between public and private health insurance when some, but not all, individuals can opt out of otherwise mandatory public insurance. Using a theoretical model, I show that public insurance is adversely selected when insurers and insureds are symmetrically informed about health‐related risks, and that there can be adverse or advantageous selection when insureds are privately informed. Using data from the German Socio‐Economic Panel, I find that (i) public insurance is, on balance, adversely selected under the German public health insurance with opt out scheme, (ii) individuals advantageously select public insurance based on risk aversion and residential location, and (iii) there is suggestive evidence of asymmetric information in the market for private health insurance. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 28 references indexed in Scilit:
- Private Information and Insurance RejectionsEconometrica, 2013
- The Oregon Health Insurance Experiment: Evidence from the First Year*The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2012
- Testing for Asymmetric Information in Private Health InsuranceThe Economic Journal, 2012
- Beyond Testing: Empirical Models of Insurance MarketsAnnual Review of Economics, 2010
- The effect of private health insurance on medical care utilization and self‐assessed health in GermanyHealth Economics, 2010
- Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance MarketsJournal of Risk and Insurance, 2010
- Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance MarketsJournal of Political Economy, 2000
- Competition with Hidden KnowledgeJournal of Political Economy, 1985
- Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect InformationThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1976
- The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market MechanismThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1970