Evaluating and Regulating the Impacts of Lobbying in theEU? The Case Study of Green Industries
- 13 March 2011
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Environmental Policy and Governance
- Vol. 21 (2) , 131-142
Abstract
How should we evaluate and regulate the impacts of lobbying in the European Union (EU)? The current lack of transparency around lobbying activities and the absence of formal regulation mean that a hidden lobbying problem may prevail. The tentative case study of green industries in the EU is illustrative. The wind turbine industry, for example, benefits from ambitious environmental target levels for greenhouse gas reductions that will increase the future market for renewable energy. In contrast, for example, no environmental target levels exist that increase the future market shares of organic farming. Rational choice theory suggests that lobbying and group size advantages can explain the observed difference in achieving environmental target levels. The EU may learn from the US legislation as a starting point for a best‐practice solution and future evaluation of impacts of lobbying in the EU. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP EnvironmentKeywords
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