Evolutionary game analysis between regional governments and shipping companies: Considering the impact of government subsidy on shipping companies
Authors:
- 2 July 2024
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Marine Pollution Bulletin
- Vol. 205, 116655
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (72072113)
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