Incomplete Enforcement of Pollution Regulation: Bargaining Power of Chinese Factories
Authors:
- Benoit LaplanteBLBenoit Laplante
Top Cited Papers
- 1 March 2003
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental and Resource Economics
- Vol. 24 (3) , 245-262
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 14 references indexed in Scilit:
- Inspections, pollution prices, and environmental performance: evidence from ChinaEcological Economics, 2001
- Instrument Choice When Regulators and Firms BargainJournal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1998
- Monitoring of Pollution Regulation: Do Local Conditions Matter?Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1998
- Informal Regulation of Industrial Pollution in Developing Countries: Evidence from IndonesiaJournal of Political Economy, 1996
- Compliance and Enforcement: Air Pollution Regulation in the U.S. Steel IndustryJournal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1996
- Bargaining in Environmental Regulation and the Ideal RegulatorJournal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1996
- Incomplete enforcement with endogenous regulatory choiceJournal of Public Economics, 1994
- Enforcement of pollution regulations in a declining industryJournal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1991
- Environmental negotiation: Its potential and its economic efficiencyJournal of Environmental Economics and Management, 1988
- Bargaining and the regulatory systemInternational Review of Law and Economics, 1986