When narrative takes over: The representation of embedded mindstates in Shakespeare’s Othello
Authors:
- 8 May 2015
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Language and Literature: International Journal of Stylistics
- Vol. 24 (2) , 148-166
Abstract
In recent times, researchers across a variety of disciplines in the humanities and social sciences have been interested in the human ability to process embedded mindstates, also known as ‘multiple-order intentionality’ (MOI): A believes that B thinks that C intends (etc.). This task is considered increasingly cognitively demanding with every order of embedding added. However, we argue that the way in which the information relevant to the task is represented in language (in particular, using a narrative) greatly influences how well people are able to deal with MOI cognitively. This effect can be illustrated by paraphrasing situations presented by a play such as Shakespeare’s Othello: by the end of Act II the audience has to understand that Iago intends that Cassio believes that Desdemona intends that Othello believes that Cassio did not intend to disturb the peace. Formulated this way, using sentence embedding to express the intentional relationships, this is highly opaque. At the same time, we know that Othello has been understood and appreciated by innumerable different audiences for ages. What is it that the play’s text does to make the audience understand all these embedded mindstates without undue cognitive strain? In this article we discuss six ‘expository strategies’ relevant to the representation of MOI and illustrate their working with examples from Shakespeare’s Othello.Keywords
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