Dispersed communication by central bank committees and the predictability of monetary policy decisions
- 26 April 2012
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 157 (1-2) , 223-244
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 27 references indexed in Scilit:
- Optimal central bank transparencyJournal of International Money and Finance, 2010
- Insiders versus Outsiders in Monetary PolicymakingAmerican Economic Review, 2008
- Opaque rather than transparent: Why the public cannot monitor monetary policyPublic Choice, 2007
- Monetary policy by committee: Why and how?European Journal of Political Economy, 2007
- Communication by Central Bank Committee Members: Different Strategies, Same Effectiveness?Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2007
- Equal Size, Equal Role? Interest Rate Interdependence Between the Euro area and the United StatesThe Economic Journal, 2005
- Are Two Heads Better Than One? Monetary Policy by CommitteeJournal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2005
- Majority Rule, Consensus Building, and the Power of the Chairman: Arthur Burns and the FOMCJournal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2004
- Communication and Monetary PolicyOxford Review of Economic Policy, 2002
- A multinominal logit analysis of the influence of policy variables and board experience on FOMC voting behaviorPublic Choice, 1997