A fictional dualism model of social robots
Author:
Open Access
- 8 April 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Ethics and Information Technology
- Vol. 23 (3) , 465-472
Abstract
In this paper I propose a Fictional Dualism model of social robots. The model helps us to understand the human emotional reaction to social robots and also acts as a guide for us in determining the significance of that emotional reaction, enabling us to better define the moral and legislative rights of social robots within our society. I propose a distinctive position that allows us to accept that robots are tools, that our emotional reaction to them can be important to their usefulness, and that this emotional reaction is not a direct indicator that robots deserve either moral consideration or rights. The positive framework of Fictional Dualism provides us with an understanding of what social robots are and with a plausible basis for our relationships with them as we bring them further into society.Keywords
This publication has 27 references indexed in Scilit:
- Simulating murder: The aversion to harmful action.Emotion, 2012
- When Is a Robot a Moral Agent?2011
- Robot rights? Towards a social-relational justification of moral considerationEthics and Information Technology, 2010
- In good company?2010
- The Ethical Treatment of Artificially Conscious RobotsInternational Journal of Social Robotics, 2009
- Virtual moral agency, virtual moral responsibility: on the moral significance of the appearance, perception, and performance of artificial agentsAI & SOCIETY, 2009
- “My Roomba Is Rambo”: Intimate Home Appliances2007
- Anthropomorphism and the social robotRobotics and Autonomous Systems, 2003
- Designing Sociable Machines2002
- HOW CAN WE FEAR AND PITY FICTIONS?British Journal of Aesthetics, 1981