Experiments with N-Person Social Traps II
Author:
- 1 September 1988
- journal article
- research article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 32 (3) , 473-488
Abstract
A version of the Tragedy of the Commons was played by 16 four-person groups, 2 three-person groups, and 1 two-person group. Calculation of individually rational equilibria for the seven-round game was out of the question. The collectively rational strategy, on the other hand, is salient: No one is to draw from the common resource pool for the first six rounds, allowing the pool to double each round; then each is to claim an equal share of the pool, which has increasedby by a factor of 64. The game was presented under two conditions: minimal and full instructions, the latter including the disclosure of the collectively rational strategy. None of the four-person groups and neither of the two three-person groups achieved the optimal result. Only the single two-person group cooperated all the way, refraining from drawing from the pool until the last round and harvesting $38.40 on the final round. This pair was given the full instructions. Full instructions did have a positive effect, however, raising the level of cooperation as measured by several indices.Keywords
This publication has 7 references indexed in Scilit:
- Individual adaptations and structural change as solutions to social dilemmas.Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1983
- The effects of communication, resource feedback, and identifiability on behavior in a simulated commonsJournal of Experimental Social Psychology, 1981
- The effects of information in a resource management problem: A social trap analogHuman Ecology, 1978
- The commons dilemma: A simulation testing the effects of resource visibility and territorial divisionHuman Ecology, 1978
- The commons dilemmaEnvironmental Management, 1978
- Social traps.American Psychologist, 1973
- The Tragedy of the CommonsScience, 1968