Competition Between Service Providers With Strategic Resource Allocation: Application to Network Slicing
Open Access
- 10 May 2021
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 9, 76503-76517
Abstract
We propose and analyze a business model for a set of operators that use the same physical network. Each operator is entitled to a share of a network operated by an Infrastructure Provider (InP) and uses network slicing mechanisms to request network resources as needed for service provision. The network operators become Network Slice Tenants (NSTs). The InP performs the resource allocation based on a vector of weights chosen selfishly by each NST. The weights distribute the NST's share of resources between its subscribers in each cell. We model this relationship as a game propose a solution for the Nash equilibrium in which each NST chooses weights equal to the product of its share by the ratio between the total number of subscribers in the cell and the total number of subscribers in the network. We characterize the proposed solution in terms of subscription ratios and fractions of subscribers, for different cell capacities and user sensitivities. The proposed solution provides the exact values for the Nash equilibrium if the cells are homogeneous in terms of normalized capacity, which is a measure of the total amount of resources available in the cell. Otherwise, if the cells are heterogeneous, it provides an accurate approximation. We quantify the deviation from the equilibrium and conclude that it is highly accurate.Keywords
Funding Information
- Spanish Ministry of Science and Universities (MCIU/AEI) and the European Union (PGC2018-094151-B-I00, RED2018-102585-T)
This publication has 25 references indexed in Scilit:
- Virtualization of 5G Cellular Networks as a Hierarchical Combinatorial AuctionIEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing, 2015
- Radio Access Network sharing in cellular networks2013
- Modified cuckoo search: A new gradient free optimisation algorithmChaos, Solitons & Fractals, 2011
- Logarithmic laws in service quality perception: where microeconomics meets psychophysics and quality of experienceTelecommunication Systems, 2011
- Proportional response dynamics in the Fisher marketTheoretical Computer Science, 2010
- Competition in Service IndustriesOperations Research, 2007
- How to Compute Equilibrium Prices in 1891The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 2005
- Mobility modeling and analytical solution for spatial traffic distribution in wireless multimedia networksIEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 2003
- Rate control for communication networks: shadow prices, proportional fairness and stabilityJournal of the Operational Research Society, 1998
- Charging and rate control for elastic trafficEuropean Transactions on Telecommunications, 1997