Comparing Bargaining Solutions in the Shadow of Conflict: How Norms against Threats Can Have Real Effects
Authors:
- Nejat AnbarciNANejat Anbarci
- Stergios SkaperdasSSStergios Skaperdas
- Constantinos SyropoulosCSConstantinos Syropoulos
- 1 September 2002
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 106 (1) , 1-16
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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