The regulation of merchant fees in credit card markets
Author:
- 6 June 2020
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Regulatory Economics
- Vol. 57 (3) , 258-276
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- National Natural Science Foundation of China
- Institution of New Economic Development
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