Why do firms adopt stock options and who benefits? A natural experiment in China
Authors:
- Lin JiangLJLin Jiang
- Gerhard KlingGKGerhard Kling
- Hong BoHBHong Bo
- Ciaran DriverCDCiaran Driver
Open Access
- 1 December 2017
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Pacific-Basin Finance Journal
- Vol. 46, 124-140
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 34 references indexed in Scilit:
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