Sharing the Path: A Threshold Scheme from Isogenies and Error Correcting Codes
Preprint
Abstract
In 2022, a prominent supersingular isogeny-based cryptographic scheme, namely SIDH, was compromised by a key recovery attack. However, this attack does not undermine the isogeny path problem, which remains central to the security of isogeny-based cryptography. Following the attacks by Castryck and Decru, as well as Maino and Martindale, Robert gave a mature and polynomial-time algorithm that transforms the SIDH key recovery attack into a valuable cryptographic tool. In this paper, we combine this tool with advanced encoding techniques to construct a novel threshold scheme.Keywords
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This publication has 21 references indexed in Scilit:
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