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Publications
Optimal Monitoring with External Incentives: The Case of Tipping
Home
Publications
Optimal Monitoring with External Incentives: The Case of Tipping
Optimal Monitoring with External Incentives: The Case of Tipping
Author:
OA
Ofer H. Azar
Ofer H. Azar
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1 July 2004
journal article
Published by
JSTOR
in
Southern Economic Journal
Vol. 71
(1)
,
170
DOI:
10.2307/4135319
Abstract
This article examines the optimal choice of monitoring intensity when workers face external incentives (incentives that are not provided by the firm), such as t...
Keywords
OPTIMAL MONITORING
EXTERNAL INCENTIVES
MONITORING WITH EXTERNAL
CASE OF TIPPING
All Related Versions
Version 1, 2003-01-01, RePEc (Unconfirmed version)
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