Congress and the Polarity Paradox: Party Polarization, Member Incivility and Enactment of Landmark Legislation, 1891–1994
Authors:
- 1 May 2012
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Congress & the Presidency
- Vol. 39 (2) , 109-132
Abstract
This research demonstrates that a polarity paradox exists in the enactment of landmark laws by the U.S. Congress. Moderate conflict facilitates the production of landmark laws whereas movement to the polar extremes of conflict—toward low or high conflict—inhibits it. The number of landmark laws passed by a Congress is low when polarization between the parties is low, particularly if uncivil interpersonal conflict within the parties is low, and when polarization between the parties is high, particularly if uncivil interpersonal conflict between the parties is high. Movement away from these polar extremes toward moderate conflict yields increased landmark productivity.Keywords
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