Shareholders' Agreements and Voting Power: Evidence from Italian Listed Firms
Author:
- Angelo S. BaglioniABAngelo S. Baglioni
Preprint
- 1 January 2008
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This work provides an empirical investigation of shareholders' agreements signed in Italy over the past decade. The evidence shows that agreements produce a remKeywords
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