Efficient Search on the Job and the Business Cycle
Authors:
- Guido MenzioGMGuido Menzio
- Shouyong ShiSSShouyong Shi
- 1 June 2011
- journal article
- Published by University of Chicago Press in Journal of Political Economy
- Vol. 119 (3) , 468-510
Abstract
The paper develops a model of directed search on the job in which transitions of workers between unemployment and employment and across employers are driven by heterogeneity in the quality of firm-worker matches. The equilibrium is such that the agents’ value and policy functions are independent of the endogenous distribution of workers across employment states. Hence, the model can be solved outside of the steady state and used to measure the effect of cyclical productivity shocks on the labor market. Productivity shocks are found to generate large fluctuations in workers’ transitions, unemployment, and vacancies when matches are experience goods, but not when matches are inspection goods.Keywords
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