A Group Rule—Utilitarian Approach to Voter Turnout: Theory and Evidence
Authors:
Open Access
- 1 December 2004
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in American Economic Review
- Vol. 94 (5) , 1476-1504
Abstract
This paper explores a group rule–utilitarian approach to understanding voter turnout, inspired by the theoretical work of John C. Harsanyi (1980) and Timothy J. Feddersen and Alvaro Sandroni (2002). It develops a model based on this approach and studies its performance in explaining turnout in Texas liquor referenda. The results are encouraging: the comparative static predictions of the model are broadly consistent with the data, and a structurally estimated version of the model yields reasonable coefficient estimates and fits the data well. The structurally estimated model also outperforms a simple expressive voting model.Keywords
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