Hypothesizing and reasoning about attacks missed by intrusion detection systems
Authors:
Open Access
- 11 November 2004
- journal article
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Information and System Security
- Vol. 7 (4) , 591-627
Abstract
Several alert correlation methods have been proposed over the past several years to construct high-level attack scenarios from low-level intrusion alerts reported by intrusion detection systems (IDSs). However, all of these methods depend heavily on the underlying IDSs, and cannot deal with attacks missed by IDSs. In order to improve the performance of intrusion alert correlation and reduce the impact of missed attacks, this paper presents a series of techniques to hypothesize and reason about attacks possibly missed by the IDSs. In addition, this paper also discusses techniques to infer attribute values for hypothesized attacks, to validate hypothesized attacks through raw audit data, and to consolidate hypothesized attacks to generate concise attack scenarios. The experimental results in this paper demonstrate the potential of these techniques in building high-level attack scenarios.Keywords
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