Costs and Benefits of 'Friendly' Boards during Mergers and Acquisitions
Author:
- Breno SchmidtBSBreno Schmidt
Preprint
- 1 January 2009
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Finance theory predicts that board independence is not always in the shareholders’ interest. In situations where board advice is more important than monitoring,Keywords
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