RL or URL: Managing Outpatient (Tele)visits with Strategic Behavior
Authors:
Preprint
- 1 January 2023
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
Problem definition: Many outpatient care providers offer virtual service that patients can access via televisits. Televisits allow patients to wait to be seen in the location of their choice, protected from exposure to ill patients and without going through the trouble of physical travel. There is evidence, however, that televisits are more likely to lead to a supplementary in-person visit, consuming additional resources that could have been saved if the patient’s initial visit was in-person. Given this trade-off, we study whether an outpatient care provider should adopt virtual service and, if so, how best to manage a practice that simultaneously offers both virtual (or URL) and in-person (real-life, or RL) services. Methodology/results: We develop a stylized queueing-game model, which incorporates patient strategic choice between the two service channels. We study how a revenue-driven provider should allocate capacity between these two channels and how to incentivize patients for in-person visits. We find that the size of the system, measured by the total available service capacity relative to total patient demand, plays a determining role here. Small and large systems are better off focusing on one channel only and have no need to use in-person incentives, whereas medium-sized systems can benefit from offering both channels and in-person incentives. We also find that overall patient access to care may be hurt with the use of in-person incentives, unless the payment gap between the two channels is significantly large. Managerial implications: Despite the growing adoption of telemedicine, offering virtual service may not be the best choice for all providers. Capacity coordination between the virtual and in-person service channels has to be carefully balanced. Furthermore, in-person incentives need to be used with caution, otherwise patient access to care may be impaired. Proper financial incentives set up by the payer may prevent such a negative outcome.Keywords
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