Earnings-based bonus plans and the agency costs of debt
Authors:
- Augustine DuruADAugustine Duru
- Sattar A. MansiSMSattar A. Mansi
- David M. ReebDRDavid M. Reeb
- 31 October 2005
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Public Policy
- Vol. 24 (5) , 431-447
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
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