The power of moral words: Loaded language generates framing effects in the extreme dictator game
Open Access
- 1 January 2019
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Judgment and Decision Making
- Vol. 14 (3) , 309-317
Abstract
Understanding whether preferences are sensitive to the frame has been a major topic of debate in the last decades. For example, several works have explored whether the dictator game in the give frame gives rise to a different rate of pro-sociality than the same game in the take frame, leading to mixed results. Here we contribute to this debate with two experiments. In Study 1 (N=567) we implement an extreme dictator game in which the dictator either gets $0.50 and the recipient gets nothing, or the opposite (i.e., the recipient gets $0.50 and the dictator gets nothing). We experimentally manipulate the words describing the available actions using six terms, from very negative (e.g., stealing) to very positive (e.g., donating) connotations. We find that the rate of pro-sociality is affected by the words used to describe the available actions. In Study 2 (N=221) we ask brand new participants to rate each of the words used in Study 1 from “extremely wrong” to “extremely right”. We find that these moral judgments can explain the framing effect in Study 1. In sum, our studies provide evidence that framing effects in an extreme Dictator game can be generated using morally loaded language.Keywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 53 references indexed in Scilit:
- Dictator games: a meta studyExperimental Economics, 2011
- The online laboratory: conducting experiments in a real labor marketExperimental Economics, 2011
- Promoting helping behavior with framing in dictator gamesJournal of Economic Psychology, 2007
- What Do Laboratory Experiments Measuring Social Preferences Reveal About the Real World?Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2007
- Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution ExperimentsAmerican Economic Review, 2004
- The Name of the Game: Predictive Power of Reputations versus Situational Labels in Determining Prisoner’s Dilemma Game MovesPersonality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 2004
- The perceptual push: The interplay of implicit cues and explicit situational construals on behavioral intentions in the Prisoner’s DilemmaJournal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2003
- Understanding Social Preferences with Simple TestsThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2002
- ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and CompetitionAmerican Economic Review, 2000
- A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and CooperationThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1999