Dominant and subordinate outside options alter help and eviction in a pay-to-stay negotiation model
- 31 March 2018
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Behavioral Ecology
- Vol. 29 (3) , 553-562
Abstract
In several cooperatively breeding species, subordinates that do not help sufficiently are punished or evicted from the group by dominant individuals. The credibility of dominant eviction threats may vary with the social context beyond the group level: when subordinates can easily breed in a neighboring territory, dominants may be less able to demand help from subordinates. Further, dominant ability to enforce subordinate cooperation may be reduced when it is difficult to replace evicted subordinates or in small groups where each subordinate makes a large contribution to group productivity. Here, we develop a 2-player game theoretic model to examine how the social context influences subordinate help and the threshold of help at which dominants evict subordinates. In contrast to predictions, we found that dominants demand more help when dominants are less able to replace evicted subordinates, suggesting that dominants punish a dereliction of helping behavior more strongly when they are unable to compensate for the loss of an evicted subordinate. In single sealed-bid games, subordinates help less than the fitness costs they impose on dominants and help does not vary with subordinate breeding opportunities outside the group. However, when subordinates can plastically increase help in response to demanding dominants (akin to pay-to-stay dynamics), subordinates provide more help overall, but decrease their help as breeding opportunities outside of the group increase. Our results demonstrate the importance of incorporating negotiation into theoretical models of helping strategies and demonstrate that plasticity is a key mechanism underlying pay-to-stay mechanisms of cooperation.Keywords
Funding Information
- Ohio State University
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