The role of representation in Bayesian reasoning: Correcting common misconceptions
- 1 June 2007
- journal article
- open peer-commentary
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 30 (3) , 264-267
Abstract
The termsnested sets, partitive frequencies, inside-outside view, anddual processesadd little but confusion to our original analysis (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage 1995; 1999). The idea of nested set was introduced because of an oversight; it simply rephrases two of our equations. Representation in terms ofchances, in contrast, is a novel contribution yet consistent with our computational analysis – it uses exactly the same numbers as natural frequencies. We show that non-Bayesian reasoning in children, laypeople, and physicians follows multiple rules rather than a general-purpose associative process in a vaguely specified “System 1.” It is unclear what the theory in “dual process theory” is: Unless the two processes are defined, this distinction can account post hoc for almost everything. In contrast, an ecological view of cognition helps to explain how insight is elicited from the outside (the external representation of information) and, more generally, how cognitive strategies match with environmental structures.Keywords
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