Sensitivity of executive pay to accounting performance measures in all‐equity firms
Authors:
- 2 December 2005
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Accounting & Finance
- Vol. 45 (4) , 577-595
Abstract
We investigate the relation between chief executive officer compensation and accounting performance measures as a function of the firm's capital structure. We specifically analyse pay–performance relationships for all‐equity firms relative to high‐levered firms. We find a significant positive association between return on equity and the level of compensation for all‐equity firms. Consistent with optimal contracting theory, we cannot discern any such relationship for high‐levered firms. Because of agency costs of debt, managerial compensation in high‐levered firms plays the role of a precommitment mechanism in addition to its conventional role of aligning management incentives with shareholder interest.Keywords
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