Outsourcing Internet Security: Economic Analysis of Incentives for Managed Security Service Providers
Authors:
- 1 January 2005
- book chapter
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 947-958
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 11 references indexed in Scilit:
- A tale of two outsourcing contractsWirtschaftsinformatik, 2003
- Assessing the risk of IT outsourcing2002
- Going Public without Governance: Managerial Reputation EffectsThe Journal of Finance, 2000
- Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software IndustrySSRN Electronic Journal, 1999
- Information Technology, Incentives, and the Optimal Number of SuppliersJournal of Management Information Systems, 1993
- On Repeated Moral Hazard with DiscountingReview of Economic Studies, 1987
- The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent ProblemsEconometrica, 1985
- Ripoffs, Lemons, and Reputation Formation in Agency Relationships: A Laboratory Market StudyThe Journal of Finance, 1985
- Long-Term Contracts and Moral HazardThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1983
- Moral Hazard and ObservabilityThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1979