Boards, CEOs, and surviving a financial crisis: Evidence from the internet shakeout
- 10 February 2011
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Strategic Management Journal
- Vol. 32 (10) , 1025-1045
Abstract
We examine whether corporate governance matters more for firms facing financial distress. We theorize that financial crisis changes the relative costs and benefits of governance mechanisms and that more independent and smaller boards become more valuable in distressed firms. We further hypothesize that CEO power becomes increasingly beneficial as concentrated power allows the firm to respond more rapidly to the crisis. Event‐history analysis of the failure of publicly traded Internet firms over the period 2000–2002 confirms our hypotheses. Our results suggest that the association between governance and survival depends on firm and environmental context and that one‐size‐fits‐all prescriptions for governance mechanisms are therefore likely to be ineffective. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Keywords
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