The Compleat Economic Voter: New Theory and British Evidence
Authors:
- Michael S. Lewis-BeckMLMichael S. Lewis-Beck
- Richard NadeauRNRichard Nadeau
- Martial FoucaultMFMartial Foucault
- 25 September 2012
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in British Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 43 (2) , 241-261
Abstract
Almost all the prolific work done on economic voting has been based on the classic reward–punishment model, which treats the economy as a valence issue. The economy is a valence issue, but it is much more than that. This article explores two other dimensions of economic voting – position and patrimony. Investigating a 2010 British survey containing relevant measures on these three dimensions, the authors estimate their impact on vote intention, using a carefully specified system of equations. According to the evidence reported, each dimension of economic voting has its own independent effect. Moreover, together, they reveal a ‘compleat’ economic voter, who wields considerable power over electoral choice in Britain. This new result confirms and extends recent work on American and French elections.Keywords
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