Abstract
A bargaining power β-dependent utility-related-capacity (uc) concept is defined to characterize dynamic behaviors and strategic interactions of multiple users in interference networks, where a metric called degree of bargaining (DoB) is presented to measure the efficiency of presented uc. General uc-region of interference networks is formulated and analyzed by an Nash bargaining cooperative approach. Both the inner and outer bounds of the DoB are presented for the individually rational player/user with bargaining power β = 1. Furthermore, we conclude that the summation of DoB of all players approaches one in the interference networks. Finally, we give the general closed-form of optimal solution with Nash bargaining solution (NBS) and Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining (KSBS) as the special cases. Meanwhile, we give the mild condition of guaranteeing KSBS more efficient than NBS.

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