Game On: Social Networks and Markets
Author:
Preprint
- 28 February 2021
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
I present closed-form solutions for prices, portfolios, and beliefs in a model where four types of investors trade assets over time: naive investors who learn via a social network, "fanatics" possibly spreading fake news, rational short-term investors, and long-term investors. I show that fanatic and rational views dominate over time due to echo-chamber effects, and their relative importance depends on their following by influencers. Securities markets exhibit social network spillovers, large effects of influencers and thought leaders, bubbles, excess volatility, bursts of high volume, price momentum, fundamental momentum, and reversal. As an illustration of the model, I present empirical evidence on the GameStop stock.Keywords
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