Can threats improve payoffs from bargaining in markets with retaliations? Evidence from a field experiment
Authors:
- Haimanti BhattacharyaHBHaimanti Bhattacharya
- Subhasish DugarSDSubhasish Dugar
- 23 September 2024
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 148, 119-137
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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