Binary Code Retrofitting and Hardening Using SGX
Authors:
Open Access
- 3 November 2017
- conference paper
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 43-49
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
Funding Information
- National Science Foundation (CNS-1652790)
- Office of Naval Research (N00014-16-1-2265,N00014-16-1-2912,N00014-17-1-2894)
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