Sequential lending with dynamic joint liability in micro-finance
Authors:
- Shyamal ChowdhurySCShyamal Chowdhury
- Prabal Roy ChowdhuryPCPrabal Roy Chowdhury
- Kunal SenguptaKSKunal Sengupta
- 1 November 2014
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Development Economics
- Vol. 111, 167-180
Abstract
No abstract availableAll Related Versions
Funding Information
- University of Sydney
- Monash University
- PPRU, ISI Delhi (PPRU870-G)
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