Inconsistency Theories of Semantic Paradox
Author:
- 10 September 2009
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
- Vol. 79 (2) , 387-422
Abstract
It is argued that a certain form of the view that the semantic paradoxes show that natural languages are “inconsistent” provides the best response to the semantic paradoxes. After extended discussions of the views of Kirk Ludwig and Matti Eklund, it is argued that in its strongest formulation the view maintains that understanding a natural language is sharing cognition of an inconsistent semantic theory for that language with other speakers. A number of aspects of this approach are discussed and a few objections are entertained.Keywords
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