Abstract
The aim of this research was to analyze the impact of enforcement on the relationship between cross-border and domestic mergers and acquisitions (M&As) involving highly indebted targets and the earnings management of acquiring companies in G20 countries from 2010 to 2022. This study fills a gap in the literature by examining how varying levels of enforcement impact earnings management in M&As, particularly when the target companies are highly indebted. Additionally, it compares these influences in domestic and cross-border transactions. The study explores the relationship between enforcement and earnings management, which are critical indicators of accounting information quality. The analysis provides insights into how enforcement can mitigate opportunistic accounting practices in M&As, thereby affecting the transparency and usefulness of information for investors. The findings are valuable for managers, investors, and regulators, as they demonstrate how enforcement can improve the quality of accounting information, particularly in M&As involving indebted targets. This information can guide policies that promote transparency and reduce opportunistic practices. The research employed multiple regression analysis of panel data on acquirers of indebted targets. Earnings management (as measured by the modified Jones and Pae models) was the dependent variable, and the origin of the M&A (domestic or cross-border) was the independent variable, in addition to control variables. The analysis was performed on high- and low-enforcement samples. The results indicate that acquiring companies in M&As of highly indebted targets adopt more conservative accounting practices in high enforcement environments, resulting in less earnings management. In contrast, there is a greater tendency toward earnings management in low enforcement environments. Domestic M&As showed a greater propensity for earnings management than cross-border M&As.

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