Abstract
What is discrimination? There are certain instances of differential treatment that almost anyone would describe as discriminatory. Yet, when one looks deeper into the issue it seems that such near unanimity about certain core cases is simply the tip of consensus of an iceberg of disagreement or difference. For instance, is it discrimination against smokers when hospitals hire nonsmokers only? Is it sex discrimination when swinger clubs charge male, unlike female, members a fee? Not only do people differ over which cases of differential treatment they see as discriminatory, they also disagree about when discrimination is morally wrong; what makes discrimination morally wrong; and, indeed, about whether all forms of discrimination are morally wrong! Finally, people disagree over what should be done about wrongful discrimination—especially about what the state could permissibly do to eliminate wrongful discrimination, e.g. in people’s love lives. This book addresses these issues. It argues that there are different concepts of discrimination and that different purposes and contexts determine which one is the most useful. First, it gives special attention to a concept of discrimination that ties discrimination to differential treatment of people on the basis of their membership in socially salient groups. Second, it argues that discrimination is wrong, when it is, because of its harmful effects. Third, it takes issue with some of the standard devices used to counteract discrimination, e.g. proportional representation of different groups, and submits that combating discrimination requires more than state actions. Also, it argues that states may sometimes permissibly discriminate.