Federalism, decentralization and performance. A macro-quantitative analysis of the performance effects of the territorial organization of politics in industrialized democracies
Authors:
- Niels EhlertNENiels Ehlert
- Annika HennlAHAnnika Hennl
- André KaiserAKAndré Kaiser
- 1 June 2007
- journal article
- abhandlungen
- Published by Springer Nature in Politische Vierteljahresschrift
- Vol. 48 (2) , 243-268
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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